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A THINKER-BASED APPROACH TO 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Many contemporary autonomy theories of freedom of 
speech champion the perspective and freedom of just one side of 
the communicative relation—usually, the speaker or the 
listener(s). Such approaches seem to neglect or subordinate the 
autonomy interests of the other relevant parties. Other 
autonomy theories do not privilege one perspective on the 
communicative relation over another, but strangely treat the 
speakers’ interests and the listeners’ autonomy interests as 
rather discrete entities—disparate constituents both demanding 
our attention. Both strands gloss over a source of justification for 
free speech that both connects the two perspectives and 
recognizes the wider foundations that underpin their value (by 
contrast with the more narrow connections drawn between them 
by democracy theories). Specifically, both approaches celebrate 
one or more external manifestations of thought but do not focus 
on the source of speech and cognition—namely the thinker 
herself—and the conditions necessary for freedom of thought. I 
submit that a more plausible autonomy theory of freedom of 
speech arises from taking the free thinker as the central figure in 
a free speech theory. We should understand freedom of speech 
as, centrally, protecting freedom of thought. 
Hence, in this essay, I propose to sketch a particular sort of 
autonomy theory of freedom of speech, namely a thinker-based 
foundation for freedom of speech. Although this account does 
not capture all of the values of freedom of speech or yield a 
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comprehensive theory of freedom of speech, a thinker-based 
foundation can provide a stronger and more coherent 
foundation for the most important free speech protections than 
rival free speech theories, including the more common speaker-
based or listener-based autonomy theories.1 
In saying a thinker-based foundation undergirds the most 
important free speech protections, I mean ‘most important’ in a 
normative sense, and not in the sense that they are necessarily 
acknowledged as such, or at all, in contemporary free speech 
doctrine.2 My paper aims to identify strong theoretical 
foundations for the protection of free speech but not to provide 
the best theoretical account of our system or our current practices 
of protecting (or failing to protect, as the case may be)3 free 
speech. Articulating a theory of free speech along the former, 
more ideal, lines provides us with a framework to assess whether 
our current practices are justified or not, as well as which ones 
are outliers. An ideal theoretical approach also supplies both a 
measure for reform and some structural components to form the 
framework to assess new sorts of cases. 
 
 1. I have explored some aspects of a thinker-based approach in prior work. See 
Vincent Blasi & Seana V. Shiffrin, The Story of West Virginia Board of Education v. 
Barnette, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 433 (Michael Dorf ed., 2d ed. 2009); Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin, WhatIis Really Wrong with Compelled Association?, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 839 (2005) [hereinafter Shiffrin, What Is Really Wrong with Compelled 
Association?]. I do not mean to represent Vince as endorsing the general thinker-
oriented approach I outline above, however. Some other authors have explored aspects 
of thinker-based approaches as well, although from different angles and with different 
emphases. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, MODERN LIBERTY 95–123 (2007); TIMOTHY 
MACKLEM, INDEPENDENCE OF MIND 1–32 (2006); SUSAN WILLIAMS, TRUTH, 
AUTONOMY, AND SPEECH: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 130–229 
(2004); Charles Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 
U. CHI. L. REV. 225 (1992); Dana Remus Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First 
Amendment and the Scientific Method, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1479; Neil M. Richards, 
Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); Christina E. Wells, Reinvigorating 
Autonomy: Freedom and Responsibility in the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 159 (1997). See also Immanuel Kant, What is 
Orientation in Thinking?, in KANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 237, 247 (Hans Reiss ed., trans. 
H.B. Nisbet, 2d ed. 1991). Although Ed Baker’s writing often suggests a speaker-based 
approach, in email correspondence about a draft of this paper he indicated that his true 
sympathies lay with a thinker-based approach. E-mail from Ed Baker to Seana Shiffrin 
(Feb. 13, 2009) (on file with author). 
 2. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Methodology in Free Speech Theory, 97 VA. L. REV. 
549 (2011) (defending a normative approach to free speech theory that does not take 
explanation of extant doctrine as foundational). 
 3. One free speech howler from the 2009 term around which I would not care to 
tailor a free speech theory is Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2730–
31 (2010) (upholding congressional prohibition of assistance to designated terrorist 
organizations, including its application to mere speech that provides advice on how to 
petition the U.N. or how to use legal means to resolve conflicts peacefully). 
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Which freedom of speech protections figure among the 
most important is, of course, contested. My position in that 
debate is that a decent regime of freedom of speech must 
provide a principled and strong form of protection for political 
speech and, in particular, for incendiary speech and other forms 
of dissent, for religious speech, for fiction, art—whether abstract 
or representational—and music, for diaries and other forms of 
discourse meant primarily for self-consumption, and for that 
private speech and discourse, e.g. personal conversations and 
letters, crucial to developing, pursuing, and maintaining personal 
relationships.4  
Further, all of these forms of expression should enjoy 
foundational protection, by which I mean there should not be a 
lexical hierarchy of value between them, nor should the 
protections for some depend dominantly on their playing an 
instrumental role in securing the conditions for the flourishing 
practice of another. To put it more pointedly, an adequate free 
speech theory will avoid the convolutions associated with the 
more narrow democracy theories of freedom of speech and their 
efforts to explain why abstract art and music should gain free 
speech protection. Although a case could be made that the 
freedom to compose and to listen to Stravinsky is important to 
developing the sort of open personal and cultural character 
necessary for democracy to flourish or that it feeds the 
“sociological structure that is prerequisite for the formation of 
public opinion,”5 that justification is strained and bizarrely 
indirect.6 In any case, the right of Stravinsky to compose and of 
 
 4. These are, of course, theoretically informed, provisional starting points that 
strike me as highly intuitive, secure, illuminating, and important lodestars. Nonetheless, if 
a plausible theory cannot be found that supports and explains these judgments or if a 
more plausible theory would reject them for good reason, these judgments should be 
revised or discarded. That is, I regard their identification as just an early step in a process 
aimed at achieving reflective equilibrium and not as fixed or immutable ‘results’ that 
must be accommodated, no matter what the other theoretical costs. See JOHN RAWLS, A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 17–21, 46–53 (Original ed. 1971) (discussing reflective equilibrium). 
Further, the argument that follows does not, largely, use these starting points as 
premises. So, subscription to these starting points is not a precondition for the 
argument’s success; it is merely that their accommodation and explanation seems to be 
desiderata of a satisfactory theory. 
 5. See Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 VA. L. REV. 477, 
486 (2011). 
 6. Jim Weinstein offers a refreshingly candid admission of this difficulty. James 
Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the Central Value of American Free Speech 
Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491, 499 n.45 (2011). No more successful is the argument that 
democracy theories will protect the arts because to understand one another and to form a 
conception about what should be a public matter, we must have access to the forms of 
expression others engage in and deem important. See, e.g., Robert Post, Participatory 
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audiences to listen (or to cringe in non-comprehension) should 
not depend upon whether The Rite of Spring breeds democrats 
or fascists, or whether it supports, detracts from, or is 
superfluous to a democratic culture.7 
A good free speech theory should identify a non-contingent 
and direct foundation for its protection. On the other hand, 
protection for commercial and non-press, business corporate 
speech is a less central matter, one that reasonably may involve 
weaker protections and may reasonably rely heavily on more 
instrumental concerns. A good free speech theory should explain 
why commercial and business corporate speech may be different 
 
Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 VA. L. REV. 617, 621 (2011) (“So 
long as Brokeback Mountain, and indeed all forms of communication that sociologically 
we recognize as art, form part of the process by which society ponders what it believes 
and thinks, it is protected under a theory of the First Amendment that stresses 
democratic participation.”) This justification is circuitous. It is parasitic upon others’ 
developing the art form (which now we must have access to in order to understand them 
and their preferences) but either: does not provide foundational support for their 
freedom to develop it, or if it does, the argument lacks a fundamentally and specifically 
democratic form that is independent of and logically prior to an appeal to the interests of 
the autonomous thinker. 
 7. Joshua Cohen offers a far less narrow democratic account of free expression, 
one grounded in his deliberative democratic approach. His approach shows sensitivity to 
the interests of the citizen qua thinker and his approach provides a more plausible 
grounding for art, religious speech, erotic speech, and other forms of speech that are not 
explicitly or even indirectly political. Joshua Cohen, Freedom of Expression, 22 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 207 (1993), reprinted in JOSHUA COHEN, PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, DEMOCRACY 98, 114–
20 (2009) [hereinafter Cohen, Freedom of Expression]; Joshua Cohen, Democracy and 
Liberty, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 185 (Jon Elster ed., 1998), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, supra, at 223, 248–54 [hereinafter Cohen, Democracy and Liberty]; 
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 67 
(James Bohman & William Rehg eds., 1997), reprinted in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, 
DEMOCRACY, supra, at 16, 32–34 [hereinafter Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic 
Legitimacy].  
Although our approaches are fairly congenial, Cohen’s case for rights of personal, 
non-political expression is usually voiced in terms of what the citizen “reasonably takes 
to be compelling considerations” or “substantial reasons” for expression (emphasis 
added). See, e.g., Cohen, Freedom of Expression, supra note 7, at 115–17; Cohen, 
Democracy and Liberty, supra note 7, at 248–50. By contrast, I find unnecessary and 
over-demanding his stress upon agents’ having substantial, compelling or obligatory 
reasons for their particular expression. Putting aside the peculiarly intense drive of the 
single-minded artist, many citizens’ reasons for most of their speech, including a variety 
of images, melodies, artistic or quotidian thoughts, lack that charge. Nonetheless, in my 
view, they present no weaker of a case for protection. My aim is to develop an approach 
that does not rely on the idea that particular, personal expression is protected because its 
expression reasonably presents itself as akin to, or on a spectrum with, felt obligations of 
the speaker, interference of which would be unreasonable by the polity, but rather, an 
approach that is fully consistent with the admission that much personal and artistic 
speech is banal and unimportant in the grand scheme of things. A broader focus on the 
condition of the thinker, rather than on the (perceived) significance of the expression, 
seems better able to satisfy that desideratum. 
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and why arguing for their protection may be a less 
straightforward matter. 
Briefly put, I believe these desiderata are best satisfied by a 
thinker-based free speech theory that takes to be central the 
individual agent’s interest in the protection of the free 
development and operation of her mind. Legal materials (by 
which I mean to encompass laws, regulations, court rulings, and 
resolutions) and government activity inconsistent with valuing 
this protection are inconsistent with a commitment to freedom 
of speech. In my view, legal materials or activity may be 
inconsistent with valuing this protection in three main ways: (1) 
the legal materials or the government activity may, on their face, 
ban or attempt to ban the free development and operation of a 
person’s mind or those activities or materials necessary for its 
free development and operation; (2) the effect of the legal 
materials, or of the activity, may objectionably interfere with the 
free development and operation of a person’s mind; (3) the 
rationale for the materials, or the activity, may be inconsistent 
with valuing this protection.8 
In developing this position I will proceed from the 
assumption that, for the most part, we are individual human 
agents with significant (though importantly imperfect) rational 
capacities, emotional capacities, perceptual capacities and 
capacities of sentience—all of which exert influence upon each 
other.9 I will also assume that our possession and exercise of 
these capacities correctly constitute the core of what we value 
about ourselves.  
I will not say much to defend these assumptions. I do not 
regard them as especially controversial. (To address the 
 
 8. See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1135, 1164–71 (2003). 
 9. In some of us, these capacities are fledgling, partial, or compromised. 
Nonetheless, agents with them have an interest in their development and operation. 
Although the degree of development and future potential may make some difference in 
some cases and contexts, I do not think that, at base, a free speech theory delivers 
fundamentally different results depending upon whether we are discussing children, the 
mentally disabled, those suffering dementia, or fully formed adults. The most salient 
context in which degree of development might be thought normatively to make a 
difference, the schoolroom, seems better explained by reference to time, place, and 
manner restrictions than to the developmental level of children. This, of course, is a 
normative claim and one that does not entirely square with doctrinal developments over 
the last twenty years. For discussions of children and the First Amendment, see Blasi & 
Shiffrin, supra note 1; Colin M. Macleod, A Liberal Theory of Freedom of Expression for 
Children, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 55 (2004) See generally Symposium, Do Children Have 
the Same First Amendment Rights as Adults?, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2004). 
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concerns of those who disagree would require a longer 
digression than seems appropriate here.) Indeed, many popular 
theories of freedom of speech only make sense if the individual 
mind and the autonomy of its operation (a notion I will say more 
about below) are valued and treated with respect. If we did not 
regard the autonomy of the individual mind as important, it is 
hard to see why we would value its expression or outputs in the 
way and to the degree that truth theories or democratic theories 
value speech. The same holds true of speaker-based and listener-
based theories.10 Still, each theory shares the presupposition that 
the autonomous thinker fundamentally matters; speaker, 
listener, and democracies theories start from an intermediate 
point and hone in on one activity of the thinker, rather than on 
the thinker herself. Reasoning from the standpoint of the thinker 
and her interests can yield a more comprehensive, unified 
foundation for much of the freedom of speech protection than is 
yielded by starting from a more partial intermediate point. 
My aim in what follows is to show the supportive connection 
between valuing ourselves as so described and: (1) valuing 
speech; (2) valuing freedom of speech; (3) regarding speech as, in 
some politically and legally normative respects, special. With 
respect to this last item, contra Fred Schauer, I deny that an 
autonomy theory of free speech must show that speech is special 
or unique with respect to its relation to autonomy, in order to 
justify strong protections for freedom of speech. It may succeed 
at that justificatory project while articulating values that cast a 
broader net encompassing other forms of autonomous activity.11 
Indeed, I regard it as a general strength of autonomy theories 
that they explain the continuity between speech protections and 
rights of intimate association. But, although the plausibility of a 
theory of strong protections for freedom of speech does not 
depend upon its showing that speech is special, nonetheless, I do 
think speech occupies a special place in the life and politically 
germane needs of the autonomous thinker. It is worth showing 
how it is both special and, at the same time, how it connects to 
other autonomy interests. 
 
 10. Some purely instrumental theories of freedom of speech that focus on the 
importance of controlling the excesses of state authority may differ on this point. 
 11. Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284 (1984). 
Some of Post’s criticisms of autonomy theories of freedom of speech appear to be 
versions of the complaint that such theories cannot explain why speech is special. See 
Post, supra note 5, at 479–81, 484, 487. 
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AUTONOMOUS AGENTS AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
Having stated my aspirations, let me move on to the 
argument. I begin with an explicit, albeit perhaps partial, 
elaboration of the interests of autonomous thinkers. 
If we do value ourselves as rational agents with the 
capacities previously described, then I submit we should 
recognize a more articulated (though sometimes overlapping) 
list of interests that emerge from our possession of these 
valuable capacities. 
Namely, every individual, rational, human agent qua thinker 
has interests in: 
a. A capacity for practical and theoretical thought.  
Each agent has an interest in developing her mental 
capacities to be receptive of, appreciative of, and responsive to 
reasons and facts in practical and theoretical thought, i.e. to be 
aware of and appropriately responsive to the true, the false, and 
the unknown. 
b. Apprehending the true.  
Each agent has an interest in believing and understanding 
true things about herself, including the contents of her mind, and 
the features and forces of the environment from which she 
emerges and in which she interacts. 
c. Exercising the imagination.  
Rational agents also have interests in understanding and 
intellectually exploring non-existent possible and impossible 
environments. Such mental activities allow agents the ability to 
conceive of the future and what could be. Further, the ability to 
explore the non-existent and impossible provides an opportunity 
for the exercise of the philosophical capacities and the other 
parts of the imagination.12 
d. Becoming a distinctive individual. 
Each agent has an interest in developing a personality and 
engaging more broadly in a mental life that, while responsive to 
reasons and facts, is distinguished from others’ personalities by 
individuating features, emotions, reactions, traits, thoughts, and 
experiences that contribute to a distinctive perspective that 
embodies and represents each individual’s separateness as a 
person. 
 
 12. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 
112 YALE L.J. 1, 38–39 (2002). 
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e. Moral agency.  
Each agent has an interest in acquiring the relevant 
knowledge base and character traits as well as forming the 
relevant thoughts and intentions to comply with the 
requirements of morality. (This interest, of course, may already 
be contained in the previously articulated interests in developing 
the capacity for practical and theoretical thought, apprehending 
the true, and exercising the imagination (a-c)). 
f. Responding authentically.  
Each agent has an interest in pursuing (a-e) through 
processes that represent free and authentic forms of internal 
creation and recognition. By this, I mean roughly that rational 
agents have an interest in forming thoughts, beliefs, practical 
judgments, intentions and other mental contents on the basis of 
reasons, perceptions, and reactions through processes that, in the 
main and over the long term, are independent of distortive 
influences. In saying these processes are independent of 
distortive influences, I mean they do not follow a trajectory fully 
or largely scripted by forces external to the person that are 
distinct from the reasons and other features of the world to 
which she is responding. This is the intellectual aspect of being 
an autonomous agent. So too agents have an interest in revealing 
and sharing these mental contents at their discretion, i.e. at the 
time at which those contents seem to them correct, apt, or 
representative of themselves as well to those to whom (and at 
that time) such revelations and the relationship they forge seem 
appropriate or desirable.  
g. Living among others. 
Each rational, human agent has an interest in living among 
other social, autonomous agents who have the opportunities to 
develop their capacities in like ways. Satisfaction of this interest 
does not merely serve natural desires for companionship but 
crucially enables other interests of the agent qua thinker to be 
achieved, including the development and recognition of a 
distinctive self and character, the acquisition and confirmation of 
knowledge, and the development and exercise of moral agency. 
h. Appropriate recognition and treatment.  
Each agent has an interest in being recognized by other 
agents for the person she is and having others treat her morally 
well. 
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This list may not be exhaustive, but I believe it identifies 
some of the more foundational and central interests that agents 
have, independent of their specific projects, interests, and 
desires, but just in virtue of their capacities for thought, broadly 
understood to include autonomous deliberation and reactions, 
practical judgment, and moral relations. Briefly summarized, 
these are interests in self-development, self-knowledge, 
knowledge of others, others’ knowledge of and respect for 
oneself, knowledge of the environments in which one interacts, 
opportunities for the exercise of one’s intellectual capacities 
including the imagination, and the intellectual prerequisites of 
moral relations.13 
Speech, and free speech in particular, are necessary 
conditions of the realization of these interests. First, given the 
opacity of our minds to one another, speech and expression are 
the only precise avenues by which one can be known as the 
individual one is by others. If what makes one a distinctive 
individual qua person is largely a matter of the contents of one’s 
mind,14 to be known by others requires the ability to transmit the 
contents of one’s mind to others. Although some information 
about one’s thoughts and beliefs may be gleaned from 
observation, such inferences are typically coarse-grained at best 
and cannot track the detail and nuance of the inner life of the 
observed. Communication of the contents of one’s mind 
primarily through linguistic means, but also through pictorial, or 
even musical representation, uniquely furthers the interest in 
being known by others. It thereby also makes possible complex 
forms of social life.15 Further, it helps to develop some of the 
 
 13. In other work, I have argued that it is a mandatory, central (and fully liberal) 
aim of law to accommodate and facilitate individuals’ ability to engage in moral agency. 
See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of 
Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214, 1222–29 (2010) [hereinafter Shiffrin, Inducing Moral 
Deliberation]; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 708, 713–19 (2007) [hereinafter, Shiffrin, Divergence]. Although I have 
mainly focused on other legal contexts of moral accommodation and facilitation, free 
speech protections may represent the most important legal context for the legal support 
of agents’ moral capacities. See also Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Compelled Association, 
Morality, and Market Dynamics, 41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 324–26 (2007) [hereinafter 
Shiffrin, Compelled Association]. 
 14. I do not mean what individuates one as a creature. In that respect, physical 
features including one’s genetic composition and perhaps other physical, non-mental 
facts may be important. 
 15. This consideration figured large among the motivations behind Kant’s views 
about truthfulness and lying. See Immanuel Kant, Of Ethical Duties Towards Others, and 
Especially Truthfulness, in LECTURES ON ETHICS 200–209 (Peter Heath & J.B. 
Schneewind eds., trans. Peter Heath, 1997). Of course, individuals may not fully know 
themselves and, further, may be self-deceived. Hence, they may not be fully equipped to 
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capacities prerequisite to moral agency because successful 
communication demands having a sense of what others are in a 
position to know and understand. Practicing communication 
initiates the process of taking others’ perspective to understand 
what others know and are in a position to grasp. 
Being known by others as the distinct individual one is is 
important in itself. It is also essential for one to be fully 
respected by others. Further, having access to the contents of 
others’ minds (at their discretion) is essential for being able to 
respect them, at least insofar as some forms of respect and other 
moral duties involve understanding and respecting individuals as 
separate persons and in light of features of their individuality, 
including their reasons, aims, and needs. Moreover, other forms 
of moral activity, as well as appreciation of the moral activity of 
others, require some recognition of agents’ motives. 
Furthermore, I suspect that one cannot fully develop a 
complex mental world, identify its contents, evaluate them, and 
distinguish between those that are merely given and those one 
endorses, unless one has the ability to externalize bits of one’s 
mind, formally distance those bits from one’s mind, identify 
them as particulars, and then evaluate them to either endorse, 
reject, or modify them. For many people, some thoughts may 
only be fully identified and known to themselves if made 
linguistically or representationally explicit. Many find that 
difficult to do using merely mental language, especially with 
sufficiently complex ideas; one has to externalize what the 
thoughts are through verbal or written speech or through other 
forms of symbolic representation to identify them completely 
(and sometimes to form them at all), a prerequisite to evaluating 
their contents. Other thoughts and methods of tracking one’s 
environment over time require some form of external 
representation because of the frailties of the human memory; to 
form the complex thought, one needs the device of external 
representation to keep track of portions of it over time.16 The 
ability and opportunity to generate external representations may 
 
share all of the contents of their minds with others and to enable others fully to know 
themselves directly through testimony. This does not diminish my point. Even when 
people are self-deceived, what they take to be their beliefs, emotions and other mental 
contents is an important aspect of who they are; further, sharing these contents with 
others and confronting the reactions of others and their observations of one’s contrary 
behavior is often crucial to resolving and eliminating self-ignorance and self-deception. 
 16. Tyler Burge, Computer Proof, Apriori Knowledge, and Other Minds: The Sixth 
Philosophical Perspectives Lecture, 32 NOÛS SUPPL. 12 1, 10–13, 19–22, 27–28 (1998); 
Tyler Burge, Memory and Persons, 112 PHIL. REV. 289, 300–03, 314–21 (2003). 
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both make public what has already fully formed in the mind and 
may render possible the formation of new sorts of thoughts that 
cannot take full form in our limited mental space.17 
Of course, it is not merely the development and 
identification of one’s thoughts that requires the use of 
representation and external articulation. To pursue our interest 
in forming true beliefs about ourselves and our environment, we 
need the help of others’ insights and beliefs, as well as their 
reactions and evaluative responses to our beliefs. Others can 
only have the basis for responding, and the means to respond 
with the sort of precision necessary to be helpful, if they are able 
to use speech. 
My argument that rational human thinkers need access to 
other thinkers under conditions in which their mental contents 
may be known with some degree of precision, explicitly 
recognized as such, and reacted to, is partially but poignantly 
confirmed by the evidence of the disastrous effects of 
involuntary solitary confinement. Prisoners in solitary 
confinement deteriorate mentally and emotionally. They 
progressively lose their grip on reality, suffering hallucinations 
and paranoia, and many become psychotic.18 “Human beings rely 
on social contact with others to test and validate their 
perceptions of the environment. Ultimately, a complete lack of 
social contact makes it difficult to distinguish what is real from 
what is not or what is external from what is internal.”19 Prisoners 
subject to solitary confinement suffer terrible depression, despair 
and anxiety; moreover, their emotional control and stability 
wane and their abilities to interact with others atrophy.20 
Of course, prisoners in solitary confinement endure more 
than just the lack of conversation and the absence of 
interlocutors; they lack fundamental forms of control over their 
lives, other sorts of interactions with persons, and other forms of 
 
 17. See also MACKLEM, supra note 1, at 1–32. 
 18. See, e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jennifer Leslie Bullock, The Psychological Effects 
of Solitary Confinement on Prisoners in Supermax Units: Reviewing What We Know and 
Recommending What Should Change, 52 INT’L J. OF OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. 
CRIMINOLOGY 622, 627 (2008); Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term 
Solitary and “Supermax” Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 124, 130–32 (2003). 
 19. Arrigo & Bullock, supra note 18, at 7 (citing the work of Haney, supra note 18). 
Similar evidence presents itself about the effects of uncorrected hearing loss. Stig 
Arlinger, Negative Consequences of Uncorrected Hearing Loss: A Review, 42 INT’L J. OF 
AUDIOLOGY 2S17, 2S17–20 (2003) (reporting that hearing loss may reduce intellectual 
and cultural stimulation, give rise to changes in the central nervous system, and may 
affect the development of dementia). 
 20. See Haney, supra note 18. 
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perceptual access to reality. But, most other prisoners lack this 
sort of control and lack broader forms of access to the world and 
yet do not suffer the degree of devastation to mental function 
that prisoners in solitary confinement do.21 “Whether in Walpole 
or Beirut or Hanoi, all human beings experience isolation as 
torture.”22 What seems to push them over the edge is the absence 
of regular, bilateral communication. My worry is that to forbid 
or substantially to restrict free expression is not tantamount to 
solitary incarceration but lies on a spectrum with it: it is to 
institute a sort of solitary confinement outside of prison but 
within one’s mind. 
So, in short, the view I am attracted to is that it is essential 
to the appropriate development and regulation of the self, and of 
one’s relation to others, that one have wide-ranging access to the 
opportunity to externalize one’s mental contents, to have the 
opportunity to make one’s mental contents known to others in 
an unscripted and authentic way, and that one has protection 
from unchosen interference with one’s mental contents from 
processes that would disrupt or disable the operation of these 
processes. That is to say, free speech is essential to the 
development and proper functioning of thinkers.  
Further, because moral agency involves the ability to take 
the perspective of other people and to respond to their 
distinctive features as individuals, including some of their mental 
contents, then free speech also plays a foundational and 
necessary (though not sufficient) role in ensuring citizens 
develop the capacity for moral agency and have the 
opportunities and information necessary to discharge their moral 
duties. Politically, these arguments should resonate with us, 
yielding an argument for constitutional protection for freedom 
of speech, both from respect for the fundamental moral rights of 
the person and also because, as I have argued elsewhere, a well-
functioning system of social cooperation and justice presupposes 
that the citizenry, by and large, have active, well-developed 
moral personalities.23 The successful operation of a democratic 
polity, as well as its meaningfulness, would also seem to depend 
 
 21. See id. at 125. 
 22. Atul Gawande, Hellhole, THE NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36 (emphasis 
added).  
 23. Shiffrin, Inducing Moral Deliberation, supra note 13, at 1231–32. See also JOHN 
STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 24–25 (Currin 
Shields ed., 1958); RAWLS, supra note 4, at 395–587.  
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upon citizens’ generally having strong and independent 
capacities for thought and judgment. 
This view makes no important distinction, at the founda-
tions, between communication about aesthetics, one’s medical 
condition and treatment,24 one’s regard for another, one’s 
sensory perceptions, the sense or lack thereof of the existence of 
a God, or one’s political beliefs. All of these communications 
serve the fundamental function of allowing an agent to transmit 
(or attempt to transmit so far as possible) the contents of her 
mind to others and to externalize her mental contents in order to 
attempt to identify, evaluate, and endorse or react to given 
contents as authentically her own; further, they allow others to 
be granted access to the information necessary to appreciate the 
thinker, on voluntary terms, and to forge a full human relation 
with her. One’s thoughts about political affairs are intrinsically 
and ex ante no more and no less central to the human self than 
thoughts about one’s mortality or one’s friends; insofar as a 
central function of free speech is to allow for the development, 
exercise, and recognition of the self, there is no reason to 
relegate the representation of thoughts about personal relations 
or self-reflection to a lesser or secondary category. Pictorial 
representations and music (and not merely discourse about 
them) should also gain foundational protection because they also 
represent the externalization of mental contents, contents that 
may not be accurately or well-captured through linguistic means; 
after all, not all thoughts are discursive or may be fully captured 
through discursive description.25 
 
 24. Respect for this right is far from a given. Prita Mulyasari was recently 
incarcerated in Indonesia for three weeks of pre-trial detention on charges of internet 
defamation after she sent an email to friends complaining about a wrongful diagnosis at a 
local hospital. After an international campaign in her defense, she was acquitted but the 
government is appealing her acquittal and seeking a 6 month prison sentence. See 
Norimitsu Onishi, Trapped Inside a Broken Judicial System after Hitting Send, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009, at A6; Turning Critics Into Criminals: The Human Rights 
Consequences of Criminal Defamation Law in Indonesia, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 5, 
26–28 (May 2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/node/90023 (discussing other criminal 
defamation cases for other consumer complaints). 
Indonesia imposes criminal penalties for defamation, enhancing them if the 
communication is sent over the internet. Truth, on its own, is not a standard defense. 
Whether it is permitted at all seems to be a matter of the judge’s discretion. Further, 
defendants seeking to use the truth defense in cases not involving public officials must 
bear the burden of proof and must show that the defamatory statement was offered from 
necessity or ‘in the general interest.’ Pursuing an unsuccessful truth defense may subject 
the defendant to an even harsher sentence of up to four years in prison. HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 24, at 16–17. 
 25. See e.g., Frank Jackson, Epiphenomenal Qualia, 32 PHIL. Q. 127, 128–30, 133–36 
(1982); Frank Jackson, What Mary Didn’t Know, 83 J. PHIL. 291 (1986).  
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On the other hand, this approach can render sensible the 
notions that non-press, business corporate and commercial 
speech may be different and that their protection may assume a 
weaker form, resting upon separate, more context-dependent 
and instrumental foundations.26 First, business corporate speech 
does not involve in any direct or straightforward fashion the 
revelation of individuals’ mental contents.27 Corporate-to-
corporate as well as corporate-to-individual speech often bear 
only an indirect relation to the revelation and development of 
the thinker or the intellectual, emotional, or moral relations 
between thinkers. Of course, thinkers may have an interest in 
access to corporate speech because corporate and commercial 
speech may report information about one’s given environment, 
but, in other circumstances, the point of corporate speech, as 
well as other commercial speech, is to alter the environment, e.g. 
to manufacture desire, not to report it. 
To be sure, however, altering the environment is also the 
aim of advocacy speech by individuals as well. That aim in no 
way diminishes the protection that should be afforded to it. 
Advocacy speech represents a form of exercise of thinkers’ 
interests in developing their moral agency and in treating one 
another well by attempting to discern and to persuade others of 
what each of us or what we together should think and do. By 
contrast, non-press, business corporate and commercial speech, 
by design, issue from an environment whose structure does not 
facilitate and, indeed, tends to discourage the authentic 
expression of individuals’ judgment. As Ed Baker has argued, 
the competitive structure of the economic market and the 
narrowly defined aims of the corporate or commercial entity 
place substantial pressures on the content of corporate and 
commercial speech. So too may the internal structural design of 
 
 26. For one example of its context-dependence on other features of the economic 
climate and our system of economic regulation, see Shiffrin, Compelled Association, 
supra note 13, at 324, 327. 
 27. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 971 (2010) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the differences between corporations and human 
beings and the distance between corporate speech and any individual points of view); C. 
Edwin Baker, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 84 IND. L.J. 981, 987–89 
(2009) (stressing that commercial corporations are limited forms of entities created for 
instrumental reasons and that the people who operate within them do not act fully 
autonomously); Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: 
Away from a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1212, 1246 
(1983) (discussing the structure of the corporation and the distance between its speech 
and the views of its shareholders). 
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the corporation.28 In Baker’s view, their content has a ‘forced 
profit orientation,’ and does not represent a ‘manifestation of 
individual freedom or choice’;29 in my somewhat weaker terms, 
external environmental pressures render more tenuous any 
charitable presupposition that such speech is sincere, authentic, 
or the product of autonomous processes. As I have argued 
elsewhere, Baker’s starkly-put position may involve a degree of 
over-generalization given market imperfections, market actors 
who are true believers, and market actors using the market and 
speech within it to further external and sincere moral goals.30 
Nonetheless, I concur with him that the market’s structure tends 
“very strongly [to] determine [corporate and commercial] speech 
content.”31 These distortive influences render more precarious 
the claims that strong presumptions against speech regulation in 
this domain reliably serve the interests of the thinker-qua-
speaker or the thinker-qua-listener as the recipient of such 
communications. Together, these considerations provide reason 
to treat non-press, business corporate and commercial speech as 
non-standard cases within a free speech domain and justifiably, 
depending on context and content, often to treat such speech as 
permissible targets of a more comprehensive scheme of 
economic regulation.32 
COMPARING A THINKER-BASED APPROACH TO 
OTHER AUTONOMY APPROACHES 
This approach, one that showcases freedom of thought and 
the needs of thinkers as such as the central theme of a free 
speech perspective, is compatible with many of the traditional 
insights associated with speaker-based and listener-based 
theories (and with democracy and truth theories for that matter). 
All of these approaches, however, work from an overly narrow 
foundation or they start by valorizing one manifestation of free 
 
 28. See Shiffrin, supra note 27, at 1247.  
 29. See C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 196, 204 
(1989); C. Edwin Baker, Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial 
Speech Quandary in Nike, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2004); Baker, supra note 
27, at 985–87. 
 30. See Shiffrin, Compelled Association, supra note 13, at 320. 
 31. Id. 
 32. See also Baker, supra note 27, at 994. I have assumed throughout this part of the 
discussion that the government’s motives in regulating commercial or business corporate 
speech would be permissible ones, that is to say that they were not driven by a rationale 
that is inconsistent with valuing the autonomous operation of the mind. The requirement 
that the government’s rationale must be a permissible one, as I specify above, is not 
suspended in this domain (or any other). 
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thought, while neglecting other manifestations that are no less 
important. Although the ability to externalize one’s mental 
contents through speech is of prime importance on this account, 
it would make no sense to give it pride of place over ensuring 
that others could listen or take in these transmissions or over the 
protection of one’s rational processes from interference or 
disruption. 
Because this account derives the basic free speech 
protection from the foundational interests of the autonomous 
agent qua thinker, it therefore, rests on sparer assumptions than 
other autonomy accounts, such as Ed Baker’s, that revolve 
around the autonomous agent qua self-governor.33 Whether in its 
substantive form (the agent as a person with the capacity “to 
pursue successfully the life she endorses”) or its formal 
conception (the agent with “the authority to make decisions 
about her own meaningful actions [and resources]”),34 Baker’s 
ideal invokes an attractive model towards which to aspire, but 
utilizes unnecessarily controversial assumptions. 
For instance, I do not believe that the autonomy case for 
protecting free speech hinges upon whether we have (or should 
have or should value) the full panoply of executive skills and 
control over our actions that the broader ideal of self-authorship 
and self-governance involves. We may have all the interests I 
identify (along with their capacities to pursue them) even if we 
lack the ability or authority to implement our decisions. 
Rightfully detained prisoners will lack both these features but, in 
my view (if not the Court’s),35 enjoy the relevant moral right of 
 
 33. See BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH, supra note 29, at 47–
69; Baker, supra note 27, at 990 (identifying autonomy in terms of embodying values in 
action). See generally Edwin Baker, Autonomy and Free Speech, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 
251 (2011) [hereinafter Baker, Autonomy]. 
 34. See Edwin Baker, Autonomy, supra note 33, at 253, 54. 
 35. See Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530–33 (2006) (plurality opinion) (upholding 
ban on access to newspapers, magazines, and personal photographs by prisoners in the 
most restrictive level of incarceration); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987) (“[W]hen 
a prison regulation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it 
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.”); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
548–52 (1979) (upholding ban on pretrial detainees receiving hardback books by mail 
unless sent directly by the publisher or a bookstore); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor 
Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129–33 (1977) (upholding ban on bulk mailing and inmate-to-
inmate solicitation to join prisoner’s union); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822–28 
(1974) (upholding ban on prisoners initiating interviews with the press). For critical 
commentary on the low protection afforded to prisoners’ First Amendment rights see 
James E. Robertson, The Rehnquist Court and the “Turnerization” of Prisoners’ Rights, 
10 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 97 (2006); The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Leading Cases, 120 
HARV. L. REV. 125, 263 (2006). 
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freedom of speech. Skepticism about the broader ideal therefore 
should not impugn the more narrowly tailored, thinker-centered 
case for free speech protections.36 Further, a thinker-based 
approach is better positioned to undergird a more expansive free 
speech protection, or at least to do so in a more direct and 
obvious fashion, because our imagination and thoughts range 
more widely than our capacity for self-governance and self-
authorship (at least if the latter is construed to involve self-
regarding action and conduct). We are able to think and 
consider topics and subjects that have no specific and direct 
relation to ourselves and our pursuit of a life we endorse. 
Explicitly making the thinker the central figure of free 
speech (as compared to focusing on the listener, the speaker, the 
self-governor or the functioning of the polity) may make a 
difference as far as what dangers and threats to free speech 
present themselves as salient. So, for example, although I find 
Tim Scanlon’s emphasis on sovereignty of deliberation in the 
Millian principle at the center of his early listener-based theory 
highly congenial, its focus on the listener may distract us from 
equally significant forms of regulation that tamper with the 
sovereignty of deliberation but that are not directly targeted at 
interfering with a speaker-listener relation.37 Scanlon’s Millian 
principle states: 
[C]ertain harms which, although they would not occur but for 
certain acts of expression, nonetheless cannot be taken as part 
of a justification for legal restrictions . . . (a) harms to certain 
individuals which consist in their coming to have false beliefs 
as a result of those acts of expression; (b) harmful 
consequences of acts performed as a result of those acts of 
expression, where the connection between [them] consists 
merely in the . . . expression le[a]d[ing] the agents to 
believe . . . these acts to be worth performing.38 
 
 36. Further, arguing just from the foundational interests of the thinker as such does 
not elicit the same worries regarding why speech in particular merits special, strong 
protection. 
 37. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
204 (1972) reprinted in T.M. SCANLON, THE DIFFICULTY OF TOLERANCE 6, 14–15 
(2003). Scanlon subsequently criticized the Millian principle on other grounds than I 
explore here and embraced a modified, but broader, theory of freedom of speech that, 
inter alia, offers primary recognition to speaker and audience interests. T.M. Scanlon, Jr., 
Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979), 
reprinted in SCANLON, supra, at 84. 
 38. Scanlon, supra note 37, at 213. 
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Although the insulation of the agent’s opportunity to form 
beliefs and opinions of her own is central to the thinker-based 
perspective, Scanlon’s Millian principle—as stated—has its 
limitations as a form of protection of the thinker. From a 
freedom of thought perspective, such a principle is under-
inclusive in an important respect.39 It is unclear why we should 
protect only autonomous or authentic processes from efforts to 
interfere with belief and conclusion formation. Should we not 
also ensure that regulations are not propounded on the grounds 
that speech will yield emotional reactions of one sort or another 
or that speech will induce sensory reactions of one sort or 
another? Aren’t these processes also central to human thought 
at least? 
Moreover, Scanlon’s principle only reaches and condemns 
regulation aimed at preventing the formation of false beliefs and 
practical judgments as consequences of expression. It does not 
directly speak to the wrongfulness of regulations or government 
activity aimed at instilling beliefs, attitudes, or reasons through 
compulsion, subliminal manipulation, or other efforts to 
circumvent rational deliberation. 
Finally, it doesn’t directly recognize the significance that 
assuming the role of speaker may have to an agent’s own 
rational development and cognition. Expanding the theory to 
correct these forms of under-inclusion would not be, I take it, 
antithetical to the spirit of Scanlon’s original approach.40 
Nonetheless, an explicitly thinker-oriented approach more 
naturally yields a comprehensive explanation of what is 
troubling about thought control, efforts at thought control, as 
well as other sorts of efforts to disrupt the free operation of the 
 
 39. The Millian principle may be overinclusive in the following respect: the 
principle as stated does not provide a clear line to distinguish between false beliefs that 
result from fraud or intentional misrepresentation and false beliefs that result from 
sincere communication (but poor judgment, understanding or perception on the part of 
the speaker or the listener). The former may reasonably count as harms, I submit, on the 
grounds that a thinker-based view of freedom of speech provides no foundational 
protection for speech that aims to distort and control the thinker’s rational processes of 
tracking and understanding her environment. Again, I doubt Scanlon would be hostile to 
this distinction, as suggested by his apparent friendliness to at least some sorts of 
defamation actions, id. at 209, and his later criticism in Freedom of Expression and 
Categories of Expression of the Millian principle for failing to allow laws on deceptive 
advertising. Scanlon, Jr., supra note 37, at 532. As originally stated, though, the Millian 
principle does not clearly make room for defamation liability. 
 40. See, e.g., SCANLON, supra note 37, at 91–92 (observing the audience’s interest 
“in having a good environment for the formation of one’s beliefs and desires” and 
offering criticisms of subliminal speech). 
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mind, whether or not such efforts also happen to operate 
through a mode of interfering interpersonal communication. 
For example, as Vince Blasi and I argued at greater length 
elsewhere,41 focusing on freedom of thought as such may yield a 
more straightforward account of the protection in West Virginia 
State Board of Education v. Barnette.42 It is not clear that the 
compelled pledge, so long as its origins are transparent, restricts 
listener opportunities, nor does its motivation violate strictures 
on respecting listeners and their deliberative capacities. Further, 
although it seems clear that the compelled pledge violates the 
free speech rights of the party who must speak the pledge, it is 
less clear that the standard themes that have occupied speaker-
oriented theories are squarely engaged here. So long as it is clear 
the pledge is compelled and so long as the speaker may disavow 
the pledge, the speaker’s ability to express herself faithfully is 
arguably not seriously abridged.43 The speaker will not be 
misunderstood by reasonable observers. Although reciting 
others’ speech may not be a part of one’s project of self-creation, 
so long as others’ uptake isn’t disrupted and so long as the 
compelled speech is not especially time consuming, focusing on 
the speaker—as such—seems strained. A more straightforward 
 
 41. See Blasi & Shiffrin, supra note 1.  
 42. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
 43. Of course, the necessity of correcting a false impression conveyed to an 
audience that does not understand the significance of the speech being compelled may 
impinge upon the speaker’s interest in remaining silent with respect to the pledge and the 
sentiments and commitments expressed therein; necessarily, the interests in self-
expression must include the ability to gather one’s thoughts and engage in self-creation at 
one’s own pace. There is something to this point but I am not sure that it carries enough 
significance to bear the full weight of the Barnette protection. Correcting a misimpression 
only requires explaining the significance or fact of compulsion; it does not require the 
speaker to make up her mind or reveal anything substantive about the pledge. This point, 
however, may be less persuasive in contexts in which any sort of correction or 
explanation may implicitly reveal some reservations about the pledge and such 
revelations would be socially or politically dangerous. Still, I assume the Barnette 
protection holds even for compelled speech that is less fraught or that is compelled in less 
charged contexts. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977). 
In any case, it is unclear how much of the substance, whether the positive protection 
or the negative limits, of the First Amendment protection should revolve around how 
unreasonable people might interpret the significance of a speech performance. For 
example, the fact that unreasonable people might take my friend’s speech to represent 
my own views and that their misunderstanding might prompt me to speak on a topic 
about which I’d prefer to remain silent does not begin to ground an argument that I have 
a right that my friend not speak in a way that may mislead the unreasonable interpreters. 
The republishing libel doctrine also wanders a little too close for my comfort to the view 
that the limits of the First Amendment may be dictated by the unreasonable reactions of 
readers. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977). 
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explanation would not focus predominantly on either side of the 
speaker-audience relationship. 
What seems most troubling about the compelled pledge is 
that the motive behind the regulation, and the possible effect, is 
to interfere with the autonomous thought processes of the 
compelled speaker. Significantly, the compelled speaker is also a 
compelled listener and is compelled to adopt postures that 
typically connote identification with her message. The aim, and I 
believe the potential effect, is to try to influence the speaker to 
associate herself with the message and implicitly to accept it, but 
through means that bypass the deliberative faculties of the agent. 
Compelled speech of this kind threatens (or at least aims) to 
interfere with free thinking processes of the speaker/listener and 
to influence mental content in ways and through methods that 
are illicit: nontransparent, via repetition, and through coercive 
manipulation of a character virtue, namely that of sincerity, that 
itself is closely connected to commitments of freedom of speech. 
Another advantage of a thinker-centered approach is that it 
yields a distinctive approach to freedom of association that both 
explains its centrality and depicts the relation between ‘intimate’ 
and ‘expressive’ as continuous. Again, the approach is not 
antithetical to other theories of freedom of speech, e.g. speaker-
based or listener-based theories. But, occupying a thinker-based 
perspective may orient one more immediately to the centrality 
of association than other theories which may lead one to value 
association through a more circuitous route. Even once one 
adopts a capacious view of the content covered by a free speech 
norm, speaker-oriented theories have tended to think of the 
point of associations as bundles of speakers who come together 
to amplify their speech—to render it louder or to garner more 
attention for their positions. The model has been to think of 
speakers as having a prior message that brings them together 
and that the associations facilitate more effective, clearer 
communication of these ideas, formed prior to association. The 
association is a conduit or a pass through: it enhances the 
effectiveness of the message but plays little formative role with 
respect to the actual speech. 
A thinker-based view of the sort I have been sketching 
identifies, at least more immediately, the role of associations in a 
free speech theory. If, as a general matter, our intellectual 
development and, indeed, our basic sanity depends upon our 
communicative interaction with others, and, if we conceive of 
the function of speech as critical to this development, we are 
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more likely to be attuned to the ways that associations serve as 
sites of idea formation and development, and to recognize the 
ways in which the development (and not merely the 
broadcasting) of content occurs through mutual collaboration 
and mutual influence in explicit and implicit ways. Such an 
approach would not focus predominantly on whether regulations 
affect the message of an association but on whether regulations 
interfere with the ability of associations to function as sites for 
mutual cognitive influence.44 
WHAT MAKES SPEECH SPECIAL? 
I observed earlier that it seems to me to be a positive 
feature, rather than an embarrassment, of a speech theory that it 
can show the compatibility of and even the continuity between 
different core protections of individual autonomy. At the same 
time, it does seem as though speech is special in some way. An 
attractive free speech theory should draw some normative 
distinction between speech as an exercise of autonomy and at 
least some other behaviors that are exercises of autonomy; 
although some forms of autonomous action should perhaps gain 
the same high level of legal protection as free speech, not all 
autonomous action should. An attractive free speech theory will 
help to make some sense of the divide. 
With respect to the first desideratum of making sense of the 
continuity, it strikes me as a strength of the thinker-based 
approach that it renders the penumbra theory of Griswold45 and 
Roe46 sensible. First, certain substantive due process protections 
provide the preconditions for a meaningful free speech 
protection. If we accept the First Amendment and its 
justifications and we accept that our form of rational agency 
requires social connections to develop and flourish, then we 
must provide for safe havens for thought, communication, and 
mutual influence: the relevant forms of safety come both in 
numbers (i.e. having associates with whom one may share 
thoughts and who may witness what happens to one) and in the 
ability to select with whom and in what ways one will share 
fundamental forms of intimacy. If the state could prevent 
intimate associations or if it could require them to occur 
 
 44. I develop an argument of this kind in greater detail in Shiffrin, What Is Really 
Wrong with Compelled Association?, supra note 1. 
 45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 46. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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(rendering the connection forced and inauthentic), it would 
obstruct individuals’ ability to forge the sort of authentic social 
connections essential for the development and maintenance of 
the personality and the free intellect. 
Second, the central substantive due process protections are 
extensions of the values protected by freedom of speech. Sexual 
intimacy, e.g., expresses and may reveal any of a variety of 
mental states towards another: in the good cases, feelings of 
love, affection or at least lusty attraction. 
But although (free) sexual intimacy and speech are both 
exercises of autonomy, both are not standard forms of 
communication or transmission of mental content; hence my 
remark that many substantive due process protections are 
extensions of the values protected by a free speech principle, 
rather than instantiations of it. A kiss typically expresses a happy 
reaction, attraction, or a warm attitude, where here I mean to 
invoke the sense of ‘express’ that is not synonymous with 
‘communicate’ but rather that means to display and to manifest, 
rather than just to transmit the fact of or to communicate.47 
Although the mental attitude may be inferred from it, the kiss is 
not typically deployed merely to convey the fact of its existence. 
It can be used that way but its communicative use is parasitic 
upon the connotations of its expressive function. 
This, of course, is a fraught distinction48 but it is one that I 
think has a point that connects to two of the reasons why speech 
 
 47. Philosophers of language often use ‘expressives’ (and its cognate verb) to refer 
to speech acts that do more than convey content but also manifest it in a more active, 
direct way. See, e.g., John R. Searle, A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts, in LANGUAGE, 
MIND, AND KNOWLEDGE 344 (Keith Gunderson ed., 1975), reprinted in JOHN R. 
SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORIES OF SPEECH ACTS 1, 15 
(1979); John R. Searle, What is Language?: Some Preliminary Remarks, 11 ETHICS & 
POL. 173, 181 (2009). Other speech acts may do even more, as with commissives, 
performatives, and declarations. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 
32–33, 151–57 (1962); KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF 
LANGUAGE 57–63 (1989). By ‘communicate’ and its cognates, I mean to capture both the 
transmission of content as well as the transmission of one’s (presumed and often implicit) 
agreement or belief in that content. Still, despite the familiarity of this use of ‘express’ in 
the philosophical literature, I couldn’t be more aware that my use of ‘express’ is not a 
salutary term in a context in which ‘freedom of expression’ is right at hand and 
sometimes is used interchangeably with “freedom of speech.” As the better term occurs, 
so will the substitution. 
 48. I will not go into detail here about the various fault-lines and strengths of 
different accounts of this distinction. Rubenfeld’s general discussion of the distinction is 
basically sensible. See Rubenfeld, supra note 12, at 42–44. Articulating the distinction 
from the perspective of sorting regulations sensitive and insensitive to it, he asks whether 
the relevant harm that a regulation targets is caused by the communicative aspect of the 
expressive act or by some other element of it. I defended something like this approach in 
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is special. I have argued that speech facilitates some of the core 
interests of autonomous agents by rendering their mental 
contents available to others and vice versa, thereby enabling 
them to know one another, to cooperate with one another, to 
investigate the world, and to enhance one’s understanding of our 
environment and our circumstances, and thereby enabling 
(though not ensuring) moral agency. 
The external representation of mental content and its 
communication plays an especially foundational role in 
furthering these ends in large part because, in general, it is so 
much more precise and informative than many of its non-
essentially communicative, expressive counterparts. I mean 
something here as mundane as that an explanation of the 
reasons why one disapproves of another’s conduct and a 
description of the emotional reactions that conduct gives rise to 
conveys more content than a wordless punch in the nose. Some 
content conveyed by communication cannot reliably and 
accurately be conveyed through other means. With respect to 
the interest in being recognized and known as the person one is 
and in providing an outlet from the isolation of each mind, 
curtailments on speech represent a severe incursion on this 
interest because speech provides unique modes of access to the 
contents of other minds. I do not mean to include only discursive 
communication here: a melody or painting of the image in my 
mind—a external representation of my internal visual imagery—
may convey more of my mental contents—including but not 
limited to my mood—than approving or disapproving behavior; 
it necessarily conveys more about my private mental contents 
than silence and its visual analog. 
As a general matter, regulations on the non-essentially 
communicative expression, manifestation or implementation of 
mental contents as such do not preclude the communication or 
transmission of the mental contents they express. Restrictions on 
my ability to express my anger through violence do not preclude 
my transmitting my anger through communicative means: saying 
I’m angry, detailing my complaints, and depicting my emotional 
maelstrom through words, images, or sounds. A restriction on 
the emotion’s non-essentially communicative expression does 
 
Speech, Death, and Double Effect. Shiffrin, supra note 8. I disagree with him in thinking, 
however, that governmental intent to punish or restrict communication as such is a 
necessary condition of running afoul of First Amendment protections; we agree that it 
may be a sufficient condition. See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 767, 775–78, 793–94 (2001).  
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not threaten to isolate me in my mind; a restriction on 
communication does. 
I hasten to add that this general point is perfectly 
compatible with the recognition that some forms of expression 
convey more than words, images, or sounds could on certain 
occasions. It may well be that, on some occasions, the depth of 
my anger can only be conveyed through violent aggression. I am 
neither arguing that agents have absolute rights to ensure that 
(any and all) others fully understand their mental contents on all 
occasions nor that externalized representations of thoughts 
always convey more than behavior that acts upon those thoughts 
in ways different than merely externalizing a representation. 
But, by and large, speech is special because it is a uniquely 
specific mechanism for the transmission of mental contents and 
their discussion, evaluation, development and refinement, 
independent from and prior to their implementation. 
Of course, I do not deny that the transmission of mental 
contents sometimes immediately affects or implements them: 
directed at the relevant person, the desire to insult or, in certain 
contexts, to humiliate or to subordinate can be implemented 
merely by being communicated. But as a general matter, 
communicative methods of transmitting mental contents 
generate the possibility of an intermediate workshop-like space 
in which one may experiment with, advance tentatively, or try 
on, revise or reject a potential aspect or element of the self or of 
one’s potential history before directly affirming it through 
endorsement or implementation.49 One cannot preface one’s 
thrown punch with ‘maybe’ or ‘consider the possibility’ and 
thereby make the assault less of a punch in the way that 
prefatory remarks will qualify a proposition subsequently 
articulated so that it becomes less than a full-blown assertion. 
We find both intelligible and significant our abilities effectively 
to revise, clarify, or even retract what one has begun to say just 
using further words.50 Whereas, I cannot revise or retract my 
intentional punch by following it immediately with more 
 
 49. Nevertheless, on occasion, even purely exploratory communication of thoughts 
and ideas may have moral significance and may be inappropriate to convey to some 
people, however explicitly inchoate they are in form.  
 50. Although sometimes the further speech will have to follow on immediately to 
be effective as a retraction as opposed to a later rethinking, our linguistic practice allows 
us to use speech to formulate and even generate our thoughts without the first stab at 
articulation rigidly gelling immediately into a final draft: we can try on an idea by 
articulating it without it immediately sticking to us or representing us. Such tentativeness 
is less possible with most actions (putting aside the special case of speech acts). 
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violence, cringing, or even with regretful words. A further 
stream of punches may clarify my assault was intentional but 
beyond that rudimentary clarification, further light—why I threw 
the punch—will typically require words. 
The capacity of speech to be tentative and exploratory—to 
allow us in a non-committal way to try on an idea, whether to 
formulate it at all or to assess its plausibility or fit with oneself—
is closely related to and helps to underpin a more familiar idea 
about the specialness of speech, namely that we must protect the 
ability to discuss and conceive of even those actions we may 
reasonably outlaw, because protecting our speech and 
conception of them permits us to revisit and justify our 
regulation; thereby, we may retain the ability to assess the 
aptness and legitimacy of our regulation and to preserve the 
ability to change course if we are mistaken. 
Not all speech stops short of action and I am not arguing 
there is an especially clear speech/action divide, but there are 
some special features that hold generally of speech that render it 
distinct from other forms of autonomous action that go beyond 
revelation of mental content. These distinctive features, I 
submit, play some role in explaining why speech is special and 
why autonomy accounts, especially those focused on the 
freedom of thought, may reasonably place a particular premium 
on preserving and protecting speech. 
 
